John Woo’s Epic Film…Red Cliff. Civil War in Ancient China « Wig-Wags

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Every once in a while, a movie comes along that takes the visual depiction of battle to a new level (Braveheart, Saving Private Ryan).  John Woo’s epic film, Red Cliff, does just that. Based on the actual Battle of Red Cliffs (see the Red Cliff Wiki here) that took place in the winter 208 CE, the film depicts the conflict between northern Chinese Prime Minister Cao Cao, and a coalition of southern forces led by Liu Bei and Sun Quan. While fact and fiction undoubtedly blur, the film is based on Records of Three Kingdoms, which provides a more historical view of the epic battle than that depicted in the novel, Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Its American distributor is Magnolia Pictures who kindly sent me a review copy last week.

This film demands your full attention. It depicts both land-based and naval warfare in an age when weapons included sword and shield, bow and arrow, spear, and fire bombs. Woo went BIG in imagery and battle size. Cao Cao was reported to have brought 800,000 soldiers to invade the south on twently thousand ships so Woo used Army soldiers to supplement extras. Animators did the rest. Those interested in the animation techniques used in creation of the film will find interesting Bill Desowitz’s article “The Battle of Red Cliff — John Woo Style!,” on the Animation World Network here. Pay particular attention to the Tortoise Shell Formation battle (below), one of the highlights of the film.

Turtle Formation Battle Scene

Animator’s also created the immense fleet of ships on which Cao Cao transported his army south. The climatic naval battle is beyond anything I’ve seen on film. Your attention is also required because the film, made in Mandarin, uses English subtitles that are occasionally difficult to see.

Red Cliff Trailer from Magnolia Pictures

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Wildly popular in China since its 2008 release, Red Cliff is now available to American audiences in select theaters and through video on demand (VOD) in a abridged format (the original film is in two parts and runs over four hours).

The cast, while perhaps less familiar to American audiences, includes some of the most popular actors on the planet.

Zhang Feng-Yi (Prime Minister Cao Cao)
Tony Leung Chiu-Wai (Strategist and warrior Zhou Yu (Ye))
Takeshi Kaneshiro (Shu strategist Zhuge Liang)
Yong You (Liu Bei)
Chang Chen (Sun Quan)
Vicky Zhao Wei (Wu princess Sun Shang Xiang)
Lin Chi-Ling (Zhou Yu’s wife, Xiao Qiao)
Shido Nakamura (Gan Xing) [also appeared in Letters from Iwo Jima]
Hu Jun (Zao Yun)

HIGHLY RECOMMEND

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New: A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598 « Wig-Wags

It’s always a pleasure to receive a book about military history that’s a bit outside of my primary focus because invariably I learn something that informs my study. The good folks

at the University of Oklahoma Press sent me a review copy of a new book by Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598. The book becomes Volume 20 of the Campaigns & Commanders Series edited by Gregory J. W. Urwin from Temple University.

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Professor Swope (left) has labeled this conflict, which included Japan, China, and Korea, as “the first great Asian War.” His is the first full-length scholarly study in English of a six year military event was pivotal to the history of warfare, drove advancement in military technologies, and produced naval battles that rivaled any in Europe.

Impressive is an extremely rich Bibliography, solid Notes, and a “Selected Chinese Character List. Swope also provides a “Dramatis Personae” section to assist with keeping the long list of players straight, a table of “Chinese Weights and Measures,” and a “Timeline of the War.” Eleven maps and fifteen illustrations are also included, the latter not for the squeamish.

I’ll be making time to read. Here’s a snippet from the Introduction…

Tucked away in a back alley of Kyoto, largely ignored amid the temples, pagodas, castles, and teahouses, stands a curious monument to the cold, calculating callousness of war in early modern East Asia. Called “Kyoto’s least mentioned and most-often-avoided tourist attractions” by one scholar, the Mimizuka (Mound of Ears) and children’s playground actually contains what is left of thousands of severed and pickled Chines and Korean noses sent back to Japan’s overlord and instigator of the First Great East Asian War of 1592-98, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-98).

Toyotomi Hideyoshi (Source: Wikipedia Commons)

Because heads, the normal proof offered to gain rewards for one’s deeds in battle in Japan, were too large and unwieldy to ship overseas, the Japanese resorted to severing the noses of slain foes and sending them home to satisfy the kampaku’s thirst for revenge against those who refused to accept his primacy in East Asia. Hideyoshi’s men were assigned a quota of three Korean (or Chinese) noses per soldier. Although modern estimates vary, it is generally accepted that 100,000-200,000 noses eventually reached Japan, though some Koreans apparently survived the ordeal and spent the rest of their days without noses.

A photo of a Mimizuka shrine. Used with the permission of Nils Ferry (planetkyoto.com). {{CopyrightedFreeUse}})

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Official Records of the Union and Confiderate Navies on Cornell University Library Making of America Collection

Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies

Author: United States. Naval War Records Office
Title: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion
Series: Office memoranda (United States. Naval War Records Office)
Publisher: Govt. Print. Off.
Place of Publication: Washington
MoA Volumes: Series I, vols. 1-27; Series II, vols 1-3 (1894 - 1922)

Browse the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies

Series I

  • Volume 2: The Operation of the Cruisers (January 1, 1863 - March 31, 1864). 1895.
  • Volume 3: The Operation of the Cruisers (April 1, 1864 - December 30, 1865). 1896.
  • Volume 4: Operations in the Gulf of Mexico (November 15, 1860 - June 7, 1861); Operations on the Atlantic Coast (January 1, 1861 - May 13, 1861); Operations on the Potomac and Rappahannock Rivers (January 5, 1861.. 1896.
  • Volume 5: Operations on the Potamac and Rappahannock Rivers (December 7, 1861 - July 31, 1865); Atlantic Blockading Squadron (April 4, 1861 - July 15, 1861). 1897.
  • Volume 6: Atlantic Blockading Squadron (July 16, 1861 - October 29, 1861); North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (October 29, 1861 - March 8, 1862). 1897.
  • Volume 7: North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (March 8, 1862 - September 4, 1862). 1898.
  • Volume 8: North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (September 5, 1862 - May 4, 1863). 1899.
  • Volume 9: North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (May 5, 1863 - May 5, 1864). 1899.
  • Volume 10: North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (May 6, 1864 - October 27, 1864). 1900.
  • Volume 11: North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (October 28, 1864 - February 1, 1865). 1900.
  • Volume 12: North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (February 2, 1865 - August 3, 1865); South Atlantic Blockading Squadron (October 29, 1861 - May 13, 1862). 1901.
  • Volume 13: South Atlantic Blockading Squadron (May 14, 1862 - April 7, 1863). 1901.
  • Volume 14: South Atlantic Blockading Squadron (April 7, 1863 - September 30, 1863). 1902.
  • Volume 15: South Atlantic Blockading Squadron (October 1, 1863 - September 30, 1864). 1902.
  • Volume 16: South Atlantic Blockading Squadron (October 1, 1864 - September 30, 1865); Gulf Blockading Squadron (June 7, 1861 - December 15, 1861). 1903.
  • Volume 17: Gulf Blockading Squadron (December 16, 1861 - February 21, 1862); East Gulf Blockading Squadron (December 22, 1862 - July 17, 1865). 1903.
  • Volume 18: West Gulf Blockading Squadron (February 21, 1862 - July 14, 1862). 1904.
  • Volume 19: West Gulf Blockading Squadron (July 15, 1862 - March 14, 1863). 1905.
  • Volume 20: West Gulf Blockading Squadron (March 15, 1863 - December 31, 1863). 1905.
  • Volume 21: West Gulf Blockading Squadron (January 1, 1864 - December 31, 1864). 1906.
  • Volume 22: West Gulf Blockading Squadron (January 1, 1865 - January 31, 1866); Naval Forces on Western Waters (May 8, 1861 - April 11, 1862). 1908.
  • Volume 23: Naval Forces on Western Waters (April 12, 1862 - December 31, 1862). 1910.
  • Volume 24: Naval Forces on Western Waters (January 1, 1863 - May 17, 1863). 1911.
  • Volume 25: Naval Forces on Western Waters (May 18, 1863 - February 29, 1864). 1912.
  • Volume 26: Naval Forces on Western Waters (March 1, 1864 - December 31, 1864). 1914.
  • Volume 27: Naval Forces on Western Waters (January 1, 1865 - September 6, 1865); Supply Vessels (January 1, 1865 - September 6, 1865). 1917.
  • Series II

  • Volume 2: Navy Department Correspondence 1861-1865, with Agents Abroad. 1921.
  • Volume 3: Proclamations, Appointments, etc. of President Davis; State Department Correspondence with Diplomatic Agents,etc.. 1922.
  • Outstanding primary sources.

    Book Review: Jefferson Davis and His Generals – The Failure of Confederate Command in the West « Wig-Wags

    STEVEN E. WOODWORTH. Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 1990. Pp. xv, 380. $16.95.

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    JeffersonDavisandHisGenerals

    Much has been written about the political and military genius of Abraham Lincoln and the successful leader he grew to be while Commander in Chief of a fractured union.  But as the country divided and civil war became a reality, a new leader was called upon to assume the role of Commander in Chief for the Confederacy, the seasoned Jefferson Davis.  At the precipice of war, betting men looking at the comparative qualifications of the two presidents could easily have predicted that Davis would outshine Lincoln. What kind of leader did Davis prove to be and how did he recruit and manage those men who would become members of his high command? What kind of generals were they and how did their personalities and actions impact the outcome of the war?

    Steven E. Woodworth’s monograph answers those questions and others through examination of Jefferson Davis’ handling of the generals who defended the newly formed Confederacy in the Western theater of the American Civil War. Against a chronology of key events, each commander is introduced with information essential to understanding the skills they brought to war. Woodworth gives us their respective birthplaces, education, military and political experience, and reasons for consideration as senior leaders. Their performances in command roles are examined along with their interactions with Davis. There is brilliance to be sure from both Davis and some of his generals. But there is also incompetence, jealousy, loss of nerve, and even a propensity toward sabotage of brother commanders. Varying degrees of analysis are given to among others: Leonidas Polk, Simon Bolivar Buckner, Albert Sidney Johnston, P.G.T. Beauregard, Braxton Bragg, Early Van Dorn, John C. Breckenridge, Edmund K. Smith, Nathan Bedford Forrest, Patrick R. Cleburne, Sterling Price, William J. Hardee, John C. Pemberton, Joseph E. Johnston, Benjamin F. Cheatham, James A. Seddon, Daniel H. Hill, James Longstreet, Gideon J. Pillow, David Twiggs, and John Bell Hood. Woodworth pulls no punches.

    Woodworth concludes that Davis was highly trained, skilled from a breadth of experience in the militarily and in politics, and eminently qualified to assume the role of Commander in Chief of the Confederacy. He was also flawed. His imperfections are revealed as the war in the West is traced from beginning to end. Davis is shown to be incapable of judging objectively the performances of personal friends. He both trusts and delegates too much to his leaders. This trait worked to the detriment of some of the most exceptional men like Albert Sidney Johnston, who accomplished miracles in the defense of western borders despite unanswered requests to fill and equip his ranks. It also left incompetents like Leonidas Polk in power, impairing more talented men like Braxton Bragg. Davis becomes consumed by the war emotionally and physically. In the end, failure in the West is seen to have contributed significantly to the failure of the Confederacy. Woodworth posits that the faults of Davis himself, stemming from a deep-seated insecurity, are contributory to this failure.
    SWoodworth
    Woodworth brings to the work the credentials of a seasoned historian. He holds history degrees from Southern Illinois University (B.A. 1982) and Rice University, where he received a Ph.D. in 1987. At the time of the book’s publication, he taught history at Toccoa Falls College in Georgia. He now teaches U.S. history, Civil War and Reconstruction, and the Old South at Texas Christian University. He also teaches military history at the American Military University. He is a prolific and award winning author.
    Woodworth provides an insightful contribution to our understanding of the Civil War by revealing the best and the worst of the Confederacy’s senior military leadership in the West. Particularly helpful to an understanding of the challenges faced by Davis’ high command is Woodworth’s campaign analysis. Also exemplary is the concise summary he provides of key points at the end of each chapter. This important study in leadership fills a gap and stands equal to and complementary of the T. Harry William classic,  Lincoln and His Generals. It is both highly readable and academically rich.

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